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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXXI JUNE, 1946 NumBER 4
DAMAGES AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE IN
UNFAIR COMPETITION CASES*
HARRY D. NIms
Introduction
One who. reads the decisions on the subject to which this article is devoted
is tempted, as was Mr. Browne when he wrote on the same problem in
his book on Trade-Marks fifty years ago, to "relapse into uncertainty and
despair of finding any nicely adjusted scheme to solve the problem."'
Public policy requires that unfair competitors must not be allowed to
profit by their wrongful methods and that those who have been injured by
them should receive adequate compensation for the loss or injury they have
suffered. Instances frequently occur where there was real injury but the
recovery hardly covered the expense of the court proceedings necessary to
obtain it, much less indemnified the plaintiff for his injury at the hands of
the defendant, or imposed on the defendant any real financial loss because
of his fraud.
The problem is an intensely practical one and one in which the public
as well as litigants have a very real interest. Merchants very properly expect
the courts to protect them against the use of unfair schemes and methods by
competitors, and furnish them a simple, workable procedure for recovering
compensation for their injuries. Consumers are entitled to similar protection
against those who seek to confuse them by unfair means. Such protection
is inadequate if it involves, as it often does, months or even years of effort.
The trade pirate often understands, to some degree at least, the difficulties
of showing damage in these cases and knows he can use unfair methods with
comparative safety; for although he may be enjoined from continuing his
acts, the likelihood of his having to pay any substantial sum is remote. He
knows also that it is almost impossible to show the extent to which an unfair
device or an infringing trade-mark diverts trade, or the extent of the injury
*This is the first of two installments under this heading, the second of which will
appear in the September issue of the QuAmTEaRY. This article is an excerpt from the
fourth edition of Mr. Nims' book, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRAvE-MARxs, which is
soon to be published.
1 BROwNE, LAW OF TRADE-MAmxs (2d ed. 1898) 517.
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which misrepresentations about a competitor or his goods or business may
cause,
It may have been practical in the past for a plaintiff to prove the sales
he has lost by reason of defendant's acts, Today it is often impossible to find
otit the actual effect on the public of unfair acts in the sale of goods, espe-
cially where the article is sold for a small price, or bought casually, or the
sales are distributed over a wide area.
The defendant's profits are often not a fair test of plaintiff's loss for "the
rights of the owner are not limited by the rogue's manipulation of the stolen
property." 2 Nor should plaintiff's recovery depend upon facts which are
only in the defendant's possession, or upon the defendant's bookkeeping,
or upon his own ability to extract information and figures from a hostile
competitor.
To award the profits which plaintiff himself has lost does not involve as
great difficulty of proof perhaps, but he should not be faced with the dilemma
of either not being fully indemnified for injury he has suffered or of opening
his books to the scrutiny of a competitor who has wronged him.
Modern methods of merchandising make it quite out of the question to
uncover and present to a court the injurious effects of many unfair competi-
tive schemes and devices. Meanwhile, so long as we do not approach the
problem realistically, the present accounting procedure will continue to
encourage and facilitate the use of practices unfair both to competitors and
to the public.
Where a defendant uses methods in taking business away from the plaintiff
effective enough to warrant the expense of using them, it seems naive for
the courts to be unable to find in them sufficient substance to serve as a
basis for adequate recovery without the complicated processes now in use.
Those who framed the early rules, some of which are still used, never heard
of radio advertising, magazines with national circulation reaching millions
of readers and other facilities of modem competition, which are designed for
and exercise most useful functions but which can be and are used also for
purposes unfair to competitors and to the consumer.
Sometimes, plaintiff's injury can be repaired by giving him the profit
which the defendant makes from his use of plaintiff's symbol. Sometimes,
however, the defendant may have made no profit or have operated at a loss,
or no accurate facts can be obtained as to the profits he has made, yet the
plaintiff's business and good will may have been injured. Again, defendant's
2Conviser v. Brownstone & Co. et al., 209 App. Div. 584, 205 N. Y. Supp. 82 (2d
Dep't 1924).
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poor quality goods may have been attributed to plaintiff; or plaintiff may
have lost customers who, attracted by defendant's misrepresentations, have
bought of defendant, not only the goods misrepresented, but other goods
as well, which, except for defendant's unfair acts, plaintiff would have sold;
or defendant may have libeled the plaintiff's business or his goods or methods,
and it may be impossible to calculate the damage which has resulted; or
the plaintiff may have been put to expense to counteract the effects of
defendant's acts. Such losses should be repaired, and it is cold comfort for
a plaintiff to be told that his compensation will be limited or denied because
defendant made no profits or because he cannot show enough actual instances
where the defendant's conduct led to substitution to warrant any substantial
compensation to him for the use of his property and the expense he has
incurred in stopping the infringing acts.
The final decrees in these cases on their face seem clear enough. They
direct a master to ascertain the profits of defendant from his unlawful acts
and the damages to plaintiff because of such acts. The difficulty is in carry-
ing them into effect, and these difficulties of application seem to be due to
the retention of inherited rules some of which should have been discarded
long ago.
In the past, legal principles were administered in law cburts and equitable
principles in chancery courts. One who was injured by acts of unfair com-
petition or infringement of a trade-mark could sue in equity for an injunction
and force the defendant to disclose his profits and account for them; or he
could get an injunction in a court of equity and then go to a law court and
sue for his damages.
American law courts cannot issue injunctions (although law courts can
in England) , but American equity courts now assess and collect damages
in addition to granting an injunction. Most unfair competition-trade-mark
cases are brought in equity. Those at law are rare.
The equity* courts awarded plaintiff the profits which the defendant had
made from the use of the plaintiff's name or. symbol, not those which the
plaintiff had lost by the defendant's acts.4 This was on the theory that
defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark created a trustee relationship which
made the defendant responsible to the plaintiff for such profits, while plain-
tiff's own profits which may have been lost were a part of his damages which
could be collected only in courts of law.
317 & 18 Vice., c. 125 (1854) 36 & 37 Vic., c. 66 § 16 (1873).4Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 138 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); Nelson v.
Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. -75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909); The Clark Thread Company v.
The William Clark Company, 55 N. J. Eq. 658, 37 Atl. 599' (Ch. 1897); Ford v.
Foster, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 611 (1872).
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The Missouri court said in 1911 that "the remedies in equity and at law
are radically different. Equity gives as damages the profits of the defendant;
while the law limits them to the loss suffered by plaintiff. Equity restrains
future wrongs by injunction. Law seeks to prevent such future violations by
inflicting exemplary damages for past offenses." 5
The differences between the approach of courts of law and courts of
equity to profits and damages is indicated by decisions to the effect that
profits of a wrongdoer may be recovered in equity, even though the plaintiff
may not show any damage at all. The Court of Appeals of New York so
held in 1941. In an action for an injunction, damages, and an accounting
of profits, Judge Conway said:
"Inability to prove damages would not preclude plaintiffs from recov-
ering, on an accounting, profits realized from sales unlawfully made,
together with interest thereon from the time of the commencement of
the action." 6
In 1935 Mr. Justice Cardozo referred to the fact that "in patent nomen-
clature, what the infringer makes is 'profits'; what the owner of the patent
loses by such infringement is 'damages'."17 These terms are often used in
a similar way in trade-mark and unfair competition cases.
As noted above, two kinds of "profits" are involved in these cases, i.e.
those which the plaintiff has lost on sales he would have made except for
defendant's acts, and those which'defendant made from his unfair use of
plaintiff's symbols or name, from misrepresentation of his goods as plaintiff's
goods, from use of secrets of plaintiff which he fraudulently discovered, and
the like. Defendant's gains of this sort are termed "profits" but gains that
plaintiff might have made except for defendant's acts are sometimes called
"profits" and sometimes "damages."
The term "damages" is used also to describe the injuries which plaintiff
suffers from other causes than loss of his profits. Such loss may result from
injury which the defendant has inflicted on the reputation or saleability of
his goods, from defamation of his goods, and from injury to his credit and
'5Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Co. et al., 238 Mo. 409, 418, 141 S. W. 1095, 1098(1911).6Winifred Warren, Inc., et al., v. Turner's Gowns, Ltd., et al., 285 N. Y. 62, 68,
32 N. E. (2d) 793, 795, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 709 (1941) ; Cutter v. Gudebrod Bros. Co.,
190 N. Y. 252, 83 N. E. 16 (1907). See also Michel Cosmetics, Inc., v. Tsirkas et al.,
282 N. Y. 195, 26 N. E. (2d) 16, 45 U. S. Pat. Q. 627 (1940), where there were no
profits made by defendant and so only damages were recoverable.
7Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U. S. 448, 451, 56 Sup. Ct. 792, 793,
29 U. S. Pat. Q. 306 (1935) ; See also Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. of'New York
-v.'Brown et al., 166 Fed. 306 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908).
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the like. So that sometimes "damages" includes profits and other losses as
well; sometimes it refers only to plaintiff's lost profits; sometimes it does
not refer to profits at all. As a result of this confusing use of these terms,
decisions are often difficult to understand and apply. Much would be gained
if plaintiff's lost profits were always called "plaintiff's profits"; defendant's
profits were always called "defendant's profits"; other injuries suffered by
the plaintiff were termed "plaintiff's damages"; and exemplary or punitive
damages always so termed. The term "accounting of damages" is misleading
for there is no accounting of damages as distinguished from accounting of
profits. An accounting of damages is an accounting of plaintiff's lost profits.
In another action for unfair competition the bill was filed in 1933. A
trial was had and a decree entered six months later. An appeal took six
months. A petition for rehearing was filed and denied a month later. A
petition for certiorari was then filed in the United States Supreme Court
and denied. A decree awarding an accounting was finally entered nearly
three years from the starting of the suit. An appeal followed which was
decided eight months later. An accounting followed in which the Master
reported about two years and seven months later. Objections were filed,
and nine months later they were sustained. An appeal immediately followed,
which was decided nine months after that, reversing the objections to the
account but reducing the award substantially. So that the proceeding from
its inception required seven years and six months, and demanded court
action on at least eight occasions. Bankruptcy proceedings followed by
reason of which the final dividend on the accounting was not paid until
eleven years and three months from the time the suit was started.
This confusion was pointed out long ago (1887) by the Kentucky court8
when it referred to the fact that the courts award the profits of the defendant
to plaintiff and term the award "damages." As used today, the term
"damages" ma include "profits" but "profits" do not include damages. 9
"Damages" in Section 49 of the United States Code on Patents is so con-
strued.10 In awarding relief, however, the same elements of injury may
not be compensated for as profits and again as damages,"' although both
profits and damages may be awarded in a proper case.12
8Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1887).9Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. United States Light & Heating Co. et al.,
2 F. (2d) 384-388 (W. D. N. Y. 1924).
'OFranklin Brass Foundry Co. et al. v. Shapiro & Aronson, Inc., 278 Fed. 435, 442
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1921); Flat Slab Patents Co. v. Turner, 285 Fed. 257-269 (C. C. A.
8th, 1922).
"lYesbera v. Hardesty Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 120, 127 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908).
12Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 8 Sup. Ct. 894 (1888).
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In 1932 the United States Supreme Court explained its position as to
the relation of profits to damages thus:
"While the distinction is clear between damages, in the sense of actual
pecuniary loss, and profits, the latter may none the less be included in
the concept of compensatory relief. In a suit in equity against an
infringer, profits are recoverable not by way of punishment but to insure
full compensation to the party injured. As this Court said in Mowry
v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 620, 653: 'The profits which are recoverable
against an infringer of a patent are in fact a compensation for the injury
the patentee has sustained from the invasion of his right.' The court
of equity in such cases applies familiar principle in 'converting the
infringer into a trustee for the patentee as regards the profits thus
made.' Packet Co. v. Sickles, 19 Wall. 611, 617. This is not to say that
there is an actual fiduciary relation which would give the right to an
accounting for profits regardless of the existence of a basic claim to
equitable relief. Root v. Railway Co., 105 U. S. 189, 214, 215. Refer-
ring to the case last cited, this Court succinctly stated the controlling
principle in its opinion in Titghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 148, as
follows: 'But, as has been recently declared by this court, upon an
elaborate review of the cases in this country and in England, it is more
strictly accurate to say, that a court of equity, which has acquired,
upon some equitable ground, jurisdiction of a suit for the infringement
of a patent, will not send the plaintiff to a court of law to recover
damages, but will administer full relief, by awarding, as an equivalent or
a substitute for legal damages, a compensation computed and measured
by the same rule that courts of equity apply to the case of a trustee
who has wrongfully used the trust property for his own advantage.'
Profits are thus allowed 'as an equitable measure of compensation.'
Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers, 240 U. S. 251, 259. See also,
Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Plow Co., 235 U. S. 641,
647. In view of the principles governing the broader relief obtainable
in equity, as contrasted with those applicable in courts of law, it is
apparent that there is no necessary exclusion of profits from the idea
of compensation in a remedial proceeding.'
3
There is a distinction between profits and damages also in that an award
based on damages may produce one amount and one based on profits quite
another, especially where defendant's profits exceed any damages plaintiff
can prove. Whatever may be the equities involved in this difference with
respect to infringements of patents, it is to be noted that the public is far
more interested in preventing the misuse of trade symbols than in the
infringement of patents. One who infringes a patent may injure the patentee,
13Lebman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U. S. 448, 456-457, 52 Sup. Ct. 238,
241-242 (1932).
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but one who indulges in misrepresentation of merchandise injures not only
his competitor but misleads the consumer as well.
The problem is complicated further by the fact that in disposing of these
cases, the court deals with fraud and must see to it that its decision not
only protects plaintiff, but serves as a deterrent to further fraud by defendant
and others. And this latter consideration is of particular importance here
because the fraud involved is not practised only on one or more specific
individuals, the effect of which ends with them, as in the usual fraud case,
but involves acts which may confuse or mislead many persons not repre-
sented in court.
Such deterrent effect can 'be secured only through awards which will
deter defendant and others from indulging in similar practices in the
future. That such action is a duty of the court has long been realized. The
equity judge performs the functions of both chancellor and jury. It is an
accepted principle in cases involving fraud, malice, violence, or oppression,
that a jury is not confined to mere assessment of actual loss but may allow
a sum which will punish the defendant and, acting as a deterrent, benefit
the public.
This principle was recognized by Justice David Davis in 1875, in Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms et al.14 The rule of that decision has
reasonable application, to many unfair competition cases. That juries are
authorized to fix punitive or exemplary damages to punish a wrongdoer
and to deter others from the commission of a like wrong is well settled in
federal and state courts,1r and punitive damages may be awarded in equity.' 6
This problem of fixing awards assumes many guises. There are instances
(1) where the defendant made no profit; (2) where he made some profit
but not enough to indemnify the plaintiff; (3) where he made profits,
perhaps substantial ones and plaintiff has suffered only nominal loss; (4)
where he committed a wrong but its damaging effects cannot be shown with
sufficient accuracy to warrant any award against him; (5) where the article
sold by the defendant does not compete with that sold by the plaintiff and
the latter can hardly have lost sales or profits, yet the public may have been
deceived by defendant's use of plaintiff's reputation and good will.
The defendant may incur two forms of liability arising from two different
obligations. One is liability to indemnify the plaintiff for the injury in-
1491 U. S. 489, 23 L. ed. 374 (1875).
15 Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
16 Aladdin Mvfgf Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 48 U. S.
Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
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flicted on him, the other is the obligation to restore what he has gained by
his own wrong. It has been said that the two sometimes "overlap."
There seem to be at least four elements which are now used in making
up an award: (a) the profits of the defendant; (b) the profits lost by plain-
tiff; (c) plaintiff's losses, aside from profits; (d) conduct by defendant
which is malicious, willful, wanton, or recklessly indifferent to plaintiff's
rights.
The labor and outlay in time and money which the present accounting
procedure involves seems little short of a scandal, as is the failure of the
courts in certain instances to find a way to compensate those injured by
unfair practices and to take action which will discourage injury to competi-
tors and the public through use of unfair methods. If the courts are to serve
the business man effectively, better methods of handling this problem must
be found and used.
In the Horlick-Horluck case, the plaintiff had made "Horlick's Malted
Milk" for fifty years. The defendant sold "Horluck's Malted-Milk." The
plaintiff was given an injunction but no money award-not even costs.
D~fendant was put to no expense except his lawyers' fees. 1 7
Judge Baker of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Computing Scale
Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co.,'8 pointed out that in that case it took
five years after the trial and decision to fix the amount bf the award.
The delay involved in accountings may postpone the final disposition of
the litigation for years because a decree awarding an accounting is not usually
final and the decision therefore is not final until the conclusion of the
accounting. 9 The court has power at any time prior to the entry of its final
judgment at the close of the accounting to reconsider any portion of its
decision and re-open any part of the case.20
17Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. c. Horluck's, Inc., 59 F. (2d) 13, 17 13 U. S. Pat.
Q. 296 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932). See also Tillman & Bendel v. California Packing Corpo-
ration, 63 F. (2d) 498, 506, 16 U. S. Pat. Q. 332 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) ; S. S. Kresge
Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415, 420 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925); G. & C.
Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 371 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912); Swanson Mfg. Co.
v. Feinberg-Henry Mfg. Co., 54 F. Supp. 805, 59 U. S. Pat. Q. 10, 19 (S. D. N. Y.
1943) ; Hershel California Fruit Products Co. v. Contadina Brokerage and Distributing
Co., 292 Ill. App. 158, 10 N. E. (2d) 720 (1937); Warren, Inc. v. Turner's Gowns,
Ltd., et al., 285 N. Y. 62, 67, 32 N. E. (2d) 793, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 709 (1941) ; Inter-
national Latex Corp. v. Scheinberg, 263 App. Div. 861, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 591 (1st Dep't
1942) ; United Drug Co. v. Kovacs, 279 Pa. 132, 123 Atl. 654 (1924); Kickapoo
Development Corp. v. Kickapoo Orchard Co., 231 Wis. 458, 285 N. W. 354, 41 U. S.
Pat. Q. 417 (1939).
18279 Fed. 648 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
19 Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States, 320 U. S. 1, 47, 63
Sup. Ct. 1393, 1415 (1942).201d. at 47, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1415.
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An unfair competition case recently reported was begun in January, 1934.
It was reached for trial in 24 months. The trial lasted about two weeks. It
was decided in less than a month. It was promptly appealed and 'the appeal
decided in about six months. Four months were taken by certiorari pro-
ceedings to the Supreme Court and 42 months after the case was started,
accounting proceedings were begun. They took seven years and four
months, including a contempt proceeding. The plaintiff collected $54,000
net. His expenses were $71,000. The case was pending for ten years
and eleven months, and the plaintiff despite an expense of $71,000 had to
wait that time for relief.
A patent case was begun in October, 1931. It was tried five months later,
for two days, resulting in an injunction and an order for an accounting.
An appeal was concluded in a year and nine months. An accounting was
begun which involved 27 hearings and 3,000 pages of testimony. The master
reported four years and one month after the decree was entered. Objections
were filed, heard, appealed, and decided on appeal nine years and one month
after the final decree was entered. The final award gave plaintiff $150,000.
It is said he settled for $117,500, and that his expenses were considerably
over $75,000. The whole case took over twelve years!
Cases like these are grossly unfair to plaintiffs and discredit courts and
court procedure in the minds of laymen who know of them. Such inefficient
methods would not be tolerated in any well-run business organization.
The determination of what a defendant is to pay to repair damage which
he has caused by fraud is not a problem in mathematics. He is not entitled
to insist that the evidence shall substantiate an award to the last dollar
and so add to the injury he has already inflicted. Many years ago the
Supreme Court recognized that the proof in these cases need not be exact,
not only because of difficulties of proof, but also because exact proof is not
required. Defendants are often wanton wrongdoers and if so, "every doubt
and difficulty should be resolved against them !"21 In 1940, the New York
Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Lehman, took a similar
position, saying:
"It is true that the proof in these cases was often far from conclusive.
Such proof is not required. Thie defendants are wanton wrongdoers and
in such case 'every doubt and difficulty should be resolved against
them.' ,,22
21Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 19 L. ed. 566 (U. S. 1869).22Michel Cosmetics, Inc., v. Tsirkas, 282 N. Y. 195, 203, 26 N. E. (2d) 16, 19 (1940).
1946]
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Then adopting the language of judge Wales of the Delaware federal court
written in 1888 in a patent case,2 he continued:
"'All that is necessary in order to prove actual damages is to furnish
some reasonable basis or data on which to calculate them, and when-
ever the evidence is sufficiently definite to show the pecuniary loss suf-
fered by the complainant, he is entitled to be reimbursed, no matter
whether the infringer gained anything by the infringement or not.'"
In 1889, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "... there are many
things that have to be determined by court and jury in respect to which
mathematical accuracy is not possible. Take the ordinary case of condemna-
tion of real estate, the value is to be determined by the trial tribunal, whether
jury or court, and yet no one is able to state the exact value."' This is
true of unfair competition and infringement cases, for it is frequently im-
possible for the parties to furnish evidence by which the injurious effect of
a defendant's acts can be appraised with mathematical accuracy or anything
like it. This might have been possible in the simple conditions of a hundred
years ago. It is not possible now and it will not be possible in the future.
Some practical, reasonably inexpensive, and simple method must be devised
by which the courts can arrive at amounts which will not only be a fair
approximation of plaintiff's injury, but; in the interest of society, will im-
press the defendant with the fact that it does not pay to use unfair competitive
methods.
Mr. Fox in his Canadian Law of Trademarks says of the English and
Canadian rule :25
"If damages cannot be estimated with exactitude, the best reasonable
estimate must be made,26 and the court is entitled to use ordinary busi-
ness knowledge and common sense and to consider that there cannot be
deceptive trading of a considerable volume without inflicting some
measure of damage on the goodwill. How long that will last, and what
its extent will be, is a thing which no evidence, except in the most
exceptional case, could satisfactorily define, and the matter is reduced
to forming a rough estimate in a way that a jury could properly form
it.",27
23Creamer v. Bowers et al., 35 Fed. 206, 208 (C. C..Del. 1888).24Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 178, 20 Sup. Ct. 336, 340
(1899).25HAROLD G. Fox, CANADIAN LAw OF TRADE MARKS AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS (1940)
382-3.26Ledger Sons & Co. v. James Munro & Son, Ltd., 33 Rep. Pat. Cas. 53, 60 (1916).
[Mr. Fox's footnote (1)].27Draper v. Trist & Tristbestos Brake Linings, Ltd., 56 Rep. Pat. Cas. 429, 440
(1939) per Greene, M.R. [Mr. Fox's footnote (m)].
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In the Computing Scales case28 Judge Baker discussed accounting pro-
cedure. He pointed out that in an equity cause for injunction the court
finds' all the facts necessary for a money decree except the amount. He
likened the process to a homesteader's claim against one who cuts down
his trees and his right to recover the true value of the trees cut down and,
compensation for injury to the remaining trees; and adds that "the problem
is always the same-to state in terms of money the results of the trespasses."
The difficulties involved in doing this in patent causes are recognized in
the federal statute,29 which provides that where "damages or profits are not
susceptible of calculation and determination with reasonable certainty, the
court may, on evidence tending to establish the same, in its discretion,
receive opinion or expert testimony, which is hereby declared to be com-
petent and admissible, . . . and . ..may . .. decree the payment by the
defendant to the complainant of a reasonable sum as profits or general dam-
ages for the infringement. The court shall have the same power to increase.
such damages, in its discretion, as is given to increase the damages found
by verdicts in actions in the nature of actions of trespass upon the case"
but such recovery is limited to six years prior to the filing of the bill. Since
the rule is only permissive, many of the old abuses remain.
The problem in trade-mark cases is not new or insoluble. It resembles a.
problem in appraisal more than one in mathematics. The fixing of awards.
in trade-mark and unfair competition cases is governed by common law,
not by statute, except for the treble damage provision in the Trade-Mark
Act of 1905.30 There are few instances where a court cannot be given facts.
regarding the effect of a defendant's acts which will be quite as specific
and informative as those used by one who appraises property for a court
on which awards are made or values fixed in other forms of action. Such
facts in these cases might include the extent in volume and, territorially,,
of defendant's sales; the volume and extent of the defendant's advertising;
the expense to which plaintiff has been put to 'stop the infringement and
to repair its effect, including legal expenses; and the normal profit on articles.
of the character of those involved.
As early as 1889 the Florida court said: "That a man whose trade-marks.
have been infringed upon, as in this case, is entitled to compensation for
infringement is unquestioned and it strikes us that it makes no difference
28Computing Scale Co. v. Toledo Computing Scale Co., 279 Fed. 648, 672 (C. C. A-
7th, 1921).
2942 STAT. 392 (1922), 35 U. S. C. § 70 (1940).
3033 STAT. 16 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 96 (1940).
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whether the compensation to which complainant is entitled is called profits
or damages."' 1
In a Missouri case the defendant's agent was found to be "running amuck
in the cigar world, destroying reputations and offending tastes, all done
willfully, intentionally and without any sort of justification or excuse, for
dishonest gain. Yet from the very nature of the trade it was practically
impossible to prove more than nominal actual damages"' 2 and the court de-
cided that a verdict for nominal damages would support a verdict for punitive
damages, and in this way indemnified the plaintiff, partially at least.83
Damages
As already noted, the term "damages" in these cases may have various
meanings. It may mean profits or it may not refer to profits at all. An
"accounting of damages" is not one of damages, but of the plaintiff's lost
profits. Again, it 'may refer to injury suffered by plaintiff from various
kinds of fraud. As noted above, frequently it is difficult to know in which of
its meanings the word is used.
In 1942, the Supreme Court heard Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg.
Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 4 an unfair competition and trade-mark infringe-
ment case, for the express purpose of considering the problem of the measure
of profits and damages and held that if a plaintiff suffered damages beyond
the loss of profits, the decree should provide for the assessment of such °
damages.
In 1945, citing this case, the Eighth Circuit wrote this definition of
damages:
". .. Damnages recoverable may include all elements of injury to the
business of the trademark owner proximately resulting from the in-
fringer's wrongful acts, such as profits on last sales, loss from reduction
in the price of goods due to the infringing competition, damage to the
reputation of the trademark owner's goods or business, and expenses
31E1 Modello Cigar Mfg. Co. v. Eduardo F. Gato, 25 Fla. 886, 914, 7 So. 23, 28 (1889).32Lampert v. judge & Dolph Drug Co. et al., 238 Mo. 409, 422, 141 S. W. 1095, 1099
(1911).330n profits and damages, see Walter Baker & Co., Ltd. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514, 519-
520 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904) ; Regis v. Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906) ;
Westcott Chuck Co. v. Oneida National Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247, 92 N. E. 639 (1910).
84316 U. S. 203, 62 Sup. Ct. 1022, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 323 (1942).
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incurred in preventing purchasers from being deceived by the infringer's
wrongful conduct."35
An interesting definition of damages is found in Rutherford's Institutes,
which reads: "By damage we understand every loss or diminution of what
is a man's own, occasioned by the fault of another."' 6
The fixing of damages is largely a matter of discretion, and the plaintiff
carries the burden of furnishing the court with the facts and material essen-
tial to the exercise of such discretion. There can be no fixed rule upon
the subject.
To he awarded damages, a plaintiff must show that he has been injured.
For instance, an award is not orderE-d where an injunction is issued quia
timet, since the unfair acts complained of have not become effective and
the plaintiff can hardly have been injured, unless it is made to cover some
actual expense to which the plaintiff has been put by defendant's attempt
to defraud him, thwarted though it was.
Nominal damages may be recovered although no actual injury is proven.3 7
Nominal damages are given not to compensate but as a recognition of a
technical legal injury or as a basis for costs. They are not merely damages
which are small in amount, but are damages in name only, not in fact. They
may be awarded to serve as a basis for exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages are discretionary with jury or court. They are often
in the nature of increased damages and are granted where the offense is.
aggravated, wanton, or reckless. Some say they had their origin in cases
where the injury could not be estimated in money3 8 This fact is of particu-
lar interest in trade-mark and unfair competition cases where so often it is
most difficult, if not impossible, to fix an award with any exactness or
accuracy. (See Exemplary and Punitive Damages, infra.)
The damages in these cases can never be an exact equivalent of the injury
nor an exact compensation or payment for it. This was recognized as early
as 1905 by the Maine court in its often-cited decision, W. R. Lynn Shoe Co.
v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., where the court wrote:
"It is not necessary, however, for the plaintiff in such case to prove
the resulting damages in separation from other damages with mathe-
matical certainty or anything like it. He is not to be held to precision,
3 5Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. United Drug Co., 149 F. (2d) 671, 674, 65 U. S. Pat.Q. 558 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945).3 GRUTHERFoRD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAl. LAw, B. I, Ch. 17, Sec. 1 (2d Am. ed-
1832) 200.37Kimball v. Hall, 87 Conn. 563, 89 Atl. 166 (1913); Thompson v. Winchester,
19 Pick. 214, 31 Am. Dec. 135 (Mass. 1887).
SSFay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 25 C. J. S. 708 (1872).
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to the exact pound, neither more nor less, nor even to show a distinct
separation in time and circumstances. It is enough if he furnishes evi-
dence upon which the tribunal can make a reasonably probable estimate
through the exercise of intelligent judgment. Mere difficulty in making
such an estimate does not authorize the tribunal to turn the plaintiff
away without any damages. Of course in a given case the estimate may
be too large. or to small, as it may be and undoubtedly often is, in that
large class of cases in which damages cannot be calculated but neces-
sarily have to be estimated. Certainly, precision is undoubtedly very
desirable in the assessment of damages in such cases, but it is practi-
cally unattainable, and there is less danger of injustice in awarding
judgment upon reasonably intelligent estimates than in refusing it
wholly."' 9
Had other courts applied this liberal and sensible rule in recent years, large
savings to litigants would have resulted with no loss of substantial justice.
I Compensatory damages are designed to restore the plaintiff to the position
he was in before the illegal act; but often this is impossible. The damage
may be beyond any exact calculation because it is too widespread, too
intangible, or indefinite, as, for instance, the effect of fraudulent advertising
or of libel or slander of merchandise or of business (particularly where
such statements are made over the radio or in publications with a nation-
wide circulation), or of unfair interference with business. When such torts
as these are involved, the courts can award no damages at all and so allow
the offender to get off- scot free, or they can fix the damages with such
material as they have (and public policy-seems to require that this be done),
or they can use the complicated, expensive, present-day procedure.
The old courts of equity had a definite procedure for ascertaining certain
forms of damages by the issue quantum damnificatus, which was tried by a
jury. They ascertained damages also by reference to masters or auditors.
But again and again in these proceedings, whether before a jury or before
a master, the rules of evidence so complicated the proof that they became
almost a denial of justice to the injured litigant.
The old rules were rigid. Of them, Judge Story in his Equity Jurispru-
4dence says:
"... So strictly has the rule been construed, that it has been thought
that, even in cases where no remedy would exist at law,--as for example
in cases where a trustee by a breach of his trust has injured the prop-
erty,-a Court of Equity would not award damages therefor, although
if by reason of such breach of trust the trustee had made profits, it
would make him account therefor." 40
39W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 341-2, 69 At. 569, 573
(1907). (See also the introduction to this article.)
403 SToRY's EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE (14th ed. Lyon, Jr. 1918) § 1083.
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Today, it is a general rule that a court of equity, in a suit of which it
has jurisdiction and takes cognizance, may administer complete relief be-
tween the parties even though this involves the determination of legal rights
which otherwise would not be within the range of its authority.41 This seems
to be the rule in most jurisdictions; but in NewJersey the court of chancery
has held that the general rule is that unliquidated damages for a tort cannot
be recovered in equity.42 And in another New Jersey case where the court
ordered an accounting of both profits and damages without taking into
account the possible overlapping of the elements involved, it was held on
appeal that this of itself required a reversal of the decree, and the recovery
was limited to an accounting of the profits made by the defendant. 43
The general principles of damages are mirrored in the Federal Trade-
Mark Act of 1905 which authorizes damages for "reproduction, counterfeit,
copy or colorable imitation" of trade-marks registered under the Act."
These damages are "in addition to the profits to be accounted for by de-
fendant"4 5 and may be increased up to three times their amount.4 6 These
provisions of the statute are substantially a codification of the common law
except for the triple damage clause, and that is based on the principle that
damages are not necessarily limited to defendant's profits and that the
damage of plaintiff may be so intangible as to be incapable of exact assess-
ment a nd hence adequate indemnity for him necessarily requires an award
which, like punitive and exemplary damages, must be an approximation by
the court or jury. For instance, in 1944, in a case under the Trade-Mark
Act the plaintiff was awarded defendant's profits, plaintiff's counsel fees,
plaintiff's counsel's disbursements and damages to plaintiff's business. 47 This
was a secondary meaning case involving ,the name "Stetson" which was
registered under the so-called "Ten-year Law.' 48
4 1Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U. S. 488, 507, 48 Sup. Ct. 580, 584 (1928)
(citing cases).42 The L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 257, 258, 72 At.
294, 295 (1909).
4 5 Benton & Holden v. Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey et al., 122 N. J. Eq. 309, 194
Atl. 805 (1937), aff'd 123 N. J. Eq. 163, 196 Atl. 352 (Ch. 1938), which held that the
general rule is that unliquidated damages for a tort cannot be recovered in equity;
and, after discussing certain exceptions to it, cites Martin v. Martin & Wilckes, supra
note 42, as holding that on a bill to enjoin unfair competition it is not permissible for
a court of equity, upon granting an injunction, to decree damages suffered by com-
plainant in addition to accounting for the profits made by the defendant.
4433 STAT. 728 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 96 (1940).
45M. at 729, 15 U. S. C. § 99.
46Id. at 729, 15 U. S. C. § 96.
47John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., Ltd., 58 F. Supp. 586, 64 U. S.
Pat. Q. 153-155 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
4833 STAT. 726 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 85 (1940).
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"Damages and profits are distinct items of recovery, and are awarded upon
quite different legal principles." 49 This was said by Judge Magruder in
a copyright case; and this is also true'with regard to trade-mark infringe-
ment and unfair competition. Liability for damages arises from injury done
to rights for which the injured party is entitled to compensation.50 The New
York court has stated the theory quite simply. "The defendants have wronged
the plaintiff. They must pay to the plaintiff the damages they have caused
the plaintiff by that wrong."5 1
Usually in these cases damages are compensatory, and are confined to
losses and injuries actually sustained as consequences of wrongful acts.5 2
But in this connection see the discussion of exemplary and punitive damages
in this article.
Generally speaking, the object of the court is to indemnify plaintiff for
the losses he has actually suffered as a result of defendant's acts,53 but
"Liability for damages . . . is not supported by the fiction which places the
infringer in the position of a trustee and requires him to account for profits
made as such."54 Defendant's liability for profits is not based on proof of
injury but on his duty to turn over to plaintiff the fruits of his use of plain-
49Sammons v. Colonial- Press, 126 F. (2d) 341, 344, 53 U. S. Pat. Q. 71 (C. C. A.
1st, 1942).
60Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F. (2d) 689, 691, 38 U. S. Pat. Q. 449
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938); Dickinson v. 0. W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 576 (C. C. A.
6th, 1925).
6IMichel Cosmetics, Inc. v. Tsirkas, 282 N. Y. 195, 199, 26 N. E. (2d) 16, 17, 45
U. S. Pat. Q. 627 (1940).52Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269 (1916);
Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F. (2d) 708, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A.
7th, 1941); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F. (2d) 632, 636, 44 U. S. Pat. Q.
379 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940) ; Dickinson v. 0. W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 576 (C. C. A.
6th, 1925); S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 6th,
1925) ; M. B. Fahey Tobacco Co. v. Senior, 252 Fed. 579 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918) ; Liberty
Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187, 258 N. W.' 241 (1935).
53Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F. (2d) 708, 716, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268
(C. C. A. 7th, 1941). In Liberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187,
258 N. W. 241, 25 T. M. Rep. 124 (1935), the court refused damages where plaintiff's
loss of business occurred prior to notice of infringement and where plaintiff had but a
few customers in defendant's territory and maintained no office there. See also Downes
v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1934). In Mcllhenny Co.
v. Bulliard, 33 F. (2d) 978, 980 (W. D. La. 1928), the court refused to give general
damages on the ground that, although damages were awardable under the state statute
for trade-mark infringement, it was impossible to separate the transactions occurring
within the state from those occurring without.54Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F. (2d) 689, 691, 38 U. S. Pat. Q. 449
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 371, 372 (C. C. A.
6th, 1912) ; National Distillers Products Corp. v. K. Taylor Distilling Co., 31 F. Supp.
611, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 561 (E. D. Ky. 1940) ; Winifred Warren Inc. v. Turner's Gowns
Ltd., 285 N. Y. 62, 32 N. E. (2d) 793, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 709 (1941).
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tiff's symbols and good will.55 However plaintiff may not recover a double
compensation for the same sales. 6
In 1941, the Seventh Circuit made this statement:
".. . Damages of a compensatory character may also be allowed in
equity where the gains and profits made by the respondent are not
sufficient to compensate for the injury sustained. Gains and profits are
still the proper measure of damages in equity suits, except in cases
where the injury sustained by the infringement is plainly more than
the aggregate of what was made by the respondent, in which event the
provision is that the complainant shall be entitled to recover, in addition
to the profits to be accounted for by the respondent, the damages he
has sustained thereby. [Citing cases] ...Recoverable damages, there-
fore, include compensation for all injury to appellant's business arising
from wrongful acts committed by appellee, provided such injury was
the natural and proximate result of the wrongful acts. . . . This in-
cludes injury to business standing or good will, loss of business, addi-
tional expenses incurred because of the tort and all other elements of
injury to the busipess .... These are the governing principles applying
to compensatory damages. '57
A similar position had been taken by the Massachusetts Supreme Court
of Judicature in 1913:
"The plaintiff in such a case as this may to be sure have suffered some
particular loss or damage for which the receipt of the defendant's
profits would not compensate him. If, for example, the defendant has
attempted to undersell him, has introduced what is called a 'cut-throat
competition', thus cutting down the plaintiff's profits without corre-
spondingly increasing his own, or if the defendant has cheapened his
production by the use of inferior materials or by unsuitable processes
of manufacture, and thus has depreciated the value of the plaintiff's
trade name or of the words or symbols to which the plaintiff has ac-
quired a right, or otherwise has injured the reputation of the plaintiff's
goods and thereby caused an appreciable loss to the maker, in addition
to that caused by the actual sales which the defendant has made, the
plaintiff should be allowed to recover for such a loss besides taking the
defendant's profits, if the plaintiff has claimned and is allowed such
profits." 8
55Winifred Warren, Inc. v. Turner's Gowns Ltd., mtpra note 54.56Forster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower, 215 Mass. 136, 139, 101 N. E. 1083, 1084 (1913)
Michel v. Tsirkas, 282 N. Y. 195, 26 N. E. (2d) 16, 45 U. S. Pat. Q. 627, 30 T. M.
Rep. 509 (1940).57Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 715, 716, 48
U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
6sForster Mfg. Co. v. Cutter-Tower Co., 215 Mass. 136, 139-140, 101 N. E. 1083,
1084 (1913), citing Rowley v. Rowley, 193 Fed. 390 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1912); Regis v.
Jaynes & Co., 191 Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906).
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However, the court suggested that the plaintiff should not recover, in addi-
tion to defendant's profits, the profits which plaintiff lost as this would be
double compensation for the same sales.
In Missouri a finding of nominal damages will support exemplary
damages. 59 The same rule prevails in New York where inability to prove
the amount of damages with bccuracy seems not to be a reason for denying
damages where there is evidence that the plaintiff has been injured.60
What May Be Evidence of Danage
Acts of unfair competition sometimes produce injury the effects of which
it is almost impossible to show by evidence. As early as 1907, as noted above,
the Maine court held that a plaintiff can be required to furnish the courts only
with evidence upon which the tribunal can make a reasonably probable
estimate through the exercise of intelligent judgment.6'
The rule could not be otherwise. An imitation of a well-known brand, or
a false statement or damaging insinuation about competitive goods may be
broadcast by radio, national advertising, and in other ways quite as avail-
able to the trade pirate as to the honest competitor. To present in court
an accurate picture of the effect of such acts is often quite impossible. As
a result, the courts should accept and many do accept, as evidence of the
damaging results of unfair competition, material that formerly would have
received little consideration. As suggested elsewhere, the alternative is to
permit the defendant to profit by his unfairness if he can-at any rate to
experiment with his schemes without paying for the loss he inflicts. 62
Legal expenses incurred for protection against infringement and unfair
competition have been recovered in some instances either as compensation
or punitive damages, 63 but such allowances are rare alihough it would seem
but just that one injured by unfair acts should not be obliged to add to his
loss therefrom the expense (and sometimes it is very substantial) of obtain-
ing relief from them. See Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co.6 where expense
59Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Co. et al., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S. W. 1095 (1911).60Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Pictures Distributing Corp., 162 Misc. 608,
294 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 250 App. Div. 710, 294 N. Y. Supp. 305
(1st Dept. 1937), aff'd, 277 N. Y. 557, 13 N. E. (2d) 471 (1938).
61W. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, '342, 69 Atl. 569,
573 (1907).62See Hennessey v. Wilmerding-Loewe Co., 103 Fed. 90 (N. D. Cal. 1900); Allison
v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542 (1863); Amusement Securities Corp. v. Academy Pictures
Distributing Co., 162 Misc. 608, 294 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 250 App.
Div. 710, 294 N. Y. Supp. 305, 306 (lst Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N. Y. 557, 13 N. E.
(2d) 471 (1938).
63AIaddin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
6445 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
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in counteracting propaganda and in reassuring dealers was considered as
part of plaintiff's damages.
Profits lost by the plaintiff on sales he did not make because of the de-
fendant's acts are considered damages. But in measuring a plaintiff's dam-
ages, there is no presumption that he would have made the sales defendant
made. When a plaintiff in a trade-mark or unfair competition case seeks
to recover damages, the burden is on him to prove by competent and suffi-
cient evidence his lost sales, or that he was compelled to reduce prices as
the result of his competitor's wrongful conduct.85
Under special circumstances, however, a plaintiff is entitled to show what
he would have made had the sales been made by him.6 6 Thus where nine
out of ten customers, not knowing the difference between plaintiff's and
defendant's product, were given defendant's product, the court suggested
that damages should be measured by plaintiff's losses.67 The same rule
prevails where defendant's sales were made to plaintiff's own customers.63
Where the trade-mark involved is used on an article which may have been
employed lawfully or unlawfully, a plaintiff can recover no damages "unless
65Dickinson v. 0. W. Thum, Co., 8 F. (2d) 570, 575 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925). See also
Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F. (2d) 689, 38 U. S. Pat. Q. 449 (C. C. A.
6th, 1938); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, -224 App. Div. 193, 229 N. Y. Supp. 692, 18
T. M. Rep. 435 (4th Dep't 1928). In Michel Cosmetics, Inc. v. Tsirkas, 282 N. Y.
195, 202, 26 N. E. (2d) 16, 19, 45 U. S. Pat. Q. 627 (1940), the court follows this rule,
and distinguishes cases to the contrary, saying: "In every case where damages have
been recovered, measured by profits which the plaintiff would have derived from sales
made by a defendant if the plaintiff had made those sales, there has been some evidence
tending to show that the defendant's wrongful acts have caused the plaintiff to suffer
a commensurate decrease of profits." Evidence that plaintiff's sales and profits were
not reduced after defendants began to compete and that part of defendants' sales were
made outside of plaintiff's territory was held sufficient to bring this case within this rule.
See also Hiram Walker & Sons v. Grubman, 222 Fed. 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) where
the court denied damages in a suit for unfair competition, the defendant's product being
sold more cheaply than plaintiff's. It could not safely be assumed that all defendant's
sales were in substitution of plaintiff's product.66Lawrence-Williams Co. v. Societe Enfants Gombault, 52 F. (2d) 774, 779, 11 U. S.
Pat. Q. 75 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). In this case defendant formerly was plaintiff's exclu-
sive distributor but at time of suit was manufacturing its own product and selling it
under plaintiff's trade-mark. The court inferred that defendant would have sold plain-
tiff's article if defendant had not been making its own, saying in part: "It would follow
that plaintiff lost the sales of its product to defendant to the extent measured by
defendant's manufacture of its own, and so plaintiff's damages are the profits which
'it would have made."67Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904). See also Westcott
Chuck Co. v. Oneida N. Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247, 92 N. E. 639 (1910), where recovery
*of damages upon a stipulation reciting the profit plaintiff would have made if it had
made the sales was allowed.6
sConviser v. Brownstone & Co., 209 App. Div. 584, 205 N. Y. Supp. 82 (2d Dep't
1924). See also Griffin Mfg. Co. v. Gold Dust Corp., 159 Misc. 545, 287 N. Y. Supp.
221 (Sup. Ct. 1936), where defendant hired a former employee of plaintiff, obtaining
from him plaintiff's secret formula and process.
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it can show that it has been injured in respect to sales which it might legally
have made." 69
The Michigan rule confines damages to loss actually sustained as the
direct and natural consequence of infringing acts and speculative and un-
certain damages will 'not form a basis of recovery.70
In 1941, a federal court in Michigan said:
"The plaintiff has not proved actual damages to its business or
established a measurable loss resulting from the unfair competition.
Damages for unfair competition must be confined to the loss actually
sustained by the plaintiff as the direct and natural consequence of such
act, and damages which are uncertain or speculative cannot form the
basis of recovery." 71
All injury which is a natural result of defendant's unfair acts is an element
of damage. Where defendant bought merchandise discarded by plaintiff and
sold it under same name as that used by the plaintiff in selling the proper
quality merchandise, the House of Lords held that plaintiff was entitled to
an inquiry as to damage in which should be included all injury which was
the natural and direct consequence of defendant's unlawful acts including
loss of trade, injury to reputation, good-will, and trade and business
connections. 72
Exemplary and Punitive Damages
In 1869, the Court of Maine wrote the following regarding exemplary
damages: "The right of the jury to give exemplary damages for injuries
wantonly, recklessly or maliciously inflicted, is as old as the right of trial
by jury itself; and is not, as many seem to suppose, an innovation upon the
rules of the common law. It was settled in England more than a century
ago."78
In 1872, the New Hampshire court in a long and exhaustive opinion, of
some 50 pages, discussed the common law concept of exemplary damages
stating that they might be awarded in cases involving "aggravating circum-
stances."
74
69Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C. I. Lee & Co., 45 F. (2d) 103, 110, 6 U. S. Pat. Q. 123
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930).7OLiberty Oil Corp. v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 270 Mich. 187, 258 N. E. 241 (1935).
See also Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F. (2d) 632, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 379
(C. C. A. 6th, 1940).71Coca Cola v. Christopher, 37 F. Supp. 216, 217, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 353 (E. D. Mich.
1941). See also N. Y. Life Insurance Co. v. Orpheum Theatre & Realty Co., 100 Wash.
573, 171 Pac. 534, 8 T. M. Rep. 220 (1918).72 Spaulding v. Ganage, 35 Rep. Pat. Cas. 101 (1918).73 Charles W. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 57 Me. 202, 218 (1869).
74 Fay et ux. v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, 397 (1872).
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In 1875, in Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arns, the Supreme Court of
the United States discussed exemplary damages and held that where they
are awarded there must have been some willful misconduct, or that entire
want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference
to consequences.
75
In 1896, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said: "That in certain classes
of cases juries are authorized to give punitive or exemplary damages to
punish a wrongdoer and to deter others from the commission of a like
wrong is well-settled law in the federal courts and in the courts of this state.
[New York. The court cited cases.] In such cases exemplary damages may
be given in addition to what may be proved to be the actual money loss
to the plaintiff."' 76 Tilghnan v. Proctor in the Supreme Court is to the
same effect.7
7
Judge Lindley in Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America,78
refers to cases in Illinois and other states involving tort feasors "whose acts
are intentionally fraudulent, malicious, wilful or wanton" and says that,
"in these jurisdictions, such damages are allowed, as sometimes said, in the
interest of society" and "by way of punishment" of the defendant when
"their propriety cannot be governed or measured by any precise yardstick."
Also of interest in this connection are Judge Lindley's opinions in the
Maytag case, in 192979 and in 1931.80 This case involved attempts by the
defendant to discredit and disgrace the plaintiff by statements made in many
states intimating that it was in debt and had no credit; that its factory was
closed; that its products were defective and that its machines "were a bunch
of junk" and "no good"; that it had been sued. A jury trial was waived
and the damages were fixed by the court, after a reference to a master, at
$250,000, reduced from $500,000. The court limited itself largely to evidence
as to "the time and effort spent by appellee in protecting itself from the
damaging propaganda and counteracting the same."' This decision throws
considerable light upon the character of the evidence upon which a court
may fix damages, for the damages awarded-were not regarded as punitive
or exemplary but as compensating the plaintiff for general injury.
75Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms et al., 91 U. S. 489, 23 L. ed. 374 (1875). See
also Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Company et al., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S. W. 1095
(1911).76Press Pub. Co. y. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896).
77125 U. S. 136, 8 Sup. Ct. 894 (1887).
78116 F. (2d) 708, 716, 717, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
79 Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F. (2d) 403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929).86Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
SIMaytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F. (Zd) 299, 301 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931).
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In Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., the defendant sent out adver-
tising matter to dealers, saying if they used the material it would tie up
the plaintiff's advertising. It advertised a radio program which never existed
and did other acts the purpose of which was to profit from its competitor's
advertising. Its salesmen made false representations to the trade. After
the district court's decree, the defendant was found guilty of contempt. The
master imposed exemplary damages including the cost of a patent office
opposition proceeding and legal expenses ($18,515) and awarded the plain-
tiff $153,043 consisting of: (1) profits, $56,626; (2) punitive damages
consisting of costs of litigation, $18,515; (3) salaries, $22,769; (4) adver-
tising, $55,133; which on appeal was reduced to $100,141 and all costs.82
The decisions in these cases can be divided into those where the issue
involves the fairness of defendant's acts and those where such acts are
malicious, vicious, involve falsehood, false representation, "conscious indif-
ference to consequences," or the like. In the former there may be doubt as
-to whether plaintiff is injured; in the latter there is no such doubt; and
damages must be assessed regardless of lack of definite evidence as to its
extent or amount in dollars.
It is not uncommon to award damages which the court characterizes as
punitive or exemplary, but which are given in addition to profits. This
characterization seems unfortunate. Generally speaking, such damages are
awarded, to compensate the plaintiff more adequately, not to punish the
defendant. They are not regarded as a fine in the sense that a fine is imposed
in a criminal court. Fines go to the State while these damages, go to the
plaintiff, and, although they are usually awarded because the court finds that
the defendant has acted with an evil intent or motive, they are given to
the plaintiff, in addition to other awards to him, that he may be more ade-
quately compensated for the injury which he has suffered. It would greatly
clarify the matter if, when damages are awarded for this purpose, they were
called supplementary or additional damages.
In Iowa exemplary damages are awarded where the wrong is wilful and
malicious.83 The Maryland court states that where there is no express
S2Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 717, 48 U. S.
Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).83Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 152 Iowa 618, 631, 132 N. W. 371, 376 (1911), aff'd,
165 Iowa 625, 146 N. W. 830 (1914) (but interest on such damages is not recoverable).
See also Virtue et al. v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. et al., 123 Minn. 17, 142 N. W.
930, motion for reargument denied, id. at 45, 142 N. W. at 1136 (1913). In Day v.
Hunnicutt, 160 S. W. 134 (Tex. Civ. 1913), in which there was actual malice and
intimidation, it was held that the jury should have been instructed that plaintiff was
entitled to actual damages and also to such exemplary damages (not exceeding the
amount claimed) as the jury might allow. In Hildebrandt v. Wright, 2 N. J. Misc.
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malice, and defendant's object is merely to benefit himself, exemplary dam-
ages are not, as a rule, recoverable.84 The Minnesota court holds that the
jury may in such case give temperate damages for injury to business as they
believe to be reasonable compensation for the injury which must necessarily
result from the act of the defendant.85 And in the Second Circuit, ". . . Puni-
tive damages may be superimposed on nominal damages where there is a
malicious or deliberate wrong. ..."86
In the Maytag case the damage could not be measured by loss of sales
or general loss of business. It was based upon the extent of the circulation
of the false statements, the character of the statements, the effort required
to counteract them, the difficulties their circulation produced for the plaintiff,
etc.8 7 In some states, exemplary damages are allowed where only nominal
damages are awarded.8 8 In others to recover exemplary damages, actual
damages must be proven.89 As noted above, the principle of punitive damages
is embodied in the Trade-Mark Statute, permitting the court to treble any
award of damages.90
Judge Blodgett, in Warner v. Roehr,91 a case of counterfeitinhg trade-marks,
instructed the jury that exemplary damages might be allowed in cases of
this character where the jury is satisfied from the proof and from admis-
sions that fraud, or the intention to defraud, is at the bottom of the matter-
1001, 126 Ati. 459, 16 T. M. Rep. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1924), defendant tried to run out
of business a former employee who had gone into business in competition with him.
The jury found malice, and punitive damages therefore were held in order.84Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 Ati. 405 (1908).
s5 Virtue et al. v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. et al., 123 Minn. 17, 142 N. W. 930,
motion for reargument denied, id. at 45, 142 N. W. at 1136 (1913) (discussing evidence
of damage).86Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F. (2d) 891, 895, 34 U. S. Pat. Q. 145
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937).87Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F. (2d) 299, 7 U. S. Pat. Q. 254 (C. C. A. 7th,
1931). See also Aladdin Mfg. Co. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F. (2d) 708, 716,
48 U. S. Pat. Q. 268 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), where it is said, "Courts have, in cases in
which the action of the infringer was deliberate, fraudulent and wanton, allowed damages
in addition to profits in the following instances: Hennessey v. Wilmerding & Loewe
Co., C. C., 103 Fed. 90, 94; Simpson v. Davis, C. C., 22 Fed. 444; El Modello Cigar
Mfg. Co. v. Gato, 25 Fla. 886, 7 So. 23, 6 L. R. A. 823, 23 Am. St. Rep. 537; Sawyer
v. Kellogg, C. C., 9 Fed. 601; Benkert v. Feder, C. C., 34 Fed. 534; Graham v. Plate,
40 Cal. 593, 6 Am. Rep. 639; Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 100 Me. 461,
62 A. 499, 4 L. R. A. (x. s.) 960."88Mother Cobb's Chicken Turnovers v. Harvey Fox, 10 Cal. (2d) 203, 73 P. (2d)
1185 (1937); Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Co., et al., 238 Mo. 409, 144 S. W. 1095
(1911); Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 911, 63 U. S.
Pat. Q. 55 (D. Md. 1944) ; see also further decision 146 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944)(motion to file supplemental bill of complain denied).89Roggensack v. Winona Monument Co., 211 Iowa 1307, 233 N. W. 493 (1930).
9033 STAT. 728 (1905), 15 U. S. C. 96 (1940).
9129 Fed. Cas. 266, No. 17,189a (N. D. Ill. 1884)'.
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In Montana it is provided by statute92 that "in any action for breach of
an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to
the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant." Exemplary damages need not be pleaded, eo
nomine, but facts showing fraud, oppression, malice, or the like must be
shown under a statute authorizing imposition of such damages. 93
Where there is a directed verdict for the defendant and only nominal
damage is shown, or there is no basis upon which a jury could return a
verdict for actual damages, there will be no relief. For these reasons, among
others, unfair competition cases fare better in equity.
Damages in Suits at Law for Unfair Competition
Actions at law for unfair competition or infringement of trade-marks are
few, but there are reasons for using this side of the court where damages
are the main end sought in the litigation. As noted above, in the past, if a
plaintiff elected to proceed in equity, his award was limited to the profits
of the defendant. That is not true today in most jurisdictions. If he moves
in a law court before a jury, he may show any loss which he has suffered
from the defendant's acts and he may, in addition, ask for exemplary or
punitive damages. If he can show any injury, punitive damages may be
awarded.
In such an action in Missouri, a verdict for one cent compensatory dam-
ages supported a judgment for punitive damages. 94 The judge instructed
the jury that they might find "in addition to said actual damages such further
sum in the way of exemplary or punitive damages, by way of punishment
to defendants, and as an example to others, as in their sound judgment,
under all the evidence in the case, they believe the defendants ought to pay,
9 2MONT. Rnv. CoDms ANNO. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 8666.
93Truzzolino Food Products Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 108 Montana 408, 91 P.
(2d) 415 (1939).
b4Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Co., et al., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S. W. 1095 (1911). See also
Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F. (2d) 891, 34 U. S. Pat. Q. 145 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937), where in an action at law for unfair competition both profits and damages
were claimed. The court held that profits could only be granted in equity upon the
theory of a trust ex maleficio, and that although punitive damages might be awarded
in addition to nominal damages where there was a malicious or deliberate wrong, the
proof failed to establish that such a wrong was chargeable to the defendants. Cano v.
Arizona Frozen Products Co., 38 Ariz. 404, 300 Pac. 953 (1931), a suit at law for
unlawful use of another's trade-mark. Held that defendant should account for profits
derived from his. unauthorized use of that trade-mark. Roggensack v. Winona Monu-
ment Co., 211 Iowa 1307, 233 N. W. 493 (1930), an action based on conspiracy to
injure plaintiff's business by unfair means, plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages
only where actual damages had been proven.
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not exceeding $5,000. On appeal Roy, J., said in effect that (1) a verdict
for nominal actual damages will support a verdict for punitive damages;
(2) there are two kinds of malice, via. malice in fact, and malice in law
and legal malice, as distinguished from actual malice, will justify exemplary
damages in Missouri (legal malice is willfulness, a wrongful act done inten-
tionally without just cause); (3) there is a question as to whether cases
for the infringement of trade-marks are outside the rule allowing exemplary
damages. And it was held that defendant's agent was "running amuck in
the cigar world, destroying reputations and offending tastes, all done win-
fully, intentionally and without any sort of justification or excuse, for dis-
honest gain. Yet from the very nature of the trade it was practically impossi-
ble to prove more than nominal actual damages."9 5
In a suit at law the plaintiff must prove the damages he actually sustained
as in any other tort action, and in default of such proof can recover only
nominal or punitive damages. 96
A Montana case9 7 was tried at law with a jury, over defendant's objection,
and resulted in a judgment of $750 damages and $5,000 as punitive damages.
The action was for misuse of a trade-mark and for unfair competition.
". .. While this case was confined to injunctive relief, we can see no
reason why legal relief in the form of damages cannot be had when the
fraudulent acts of the defendant cause pecuniary loss because of injury
to the plaintiff's standing, reputation or good will [citing cases].
"The defendant contends that the court erred in compelling it to go
to trial before a jury. It contends that the complaint was grounded
upon a cause of action in equity, and that the court has exclusive juris-
diction to try the cause. We do not view the cause of action thusly.
While it is true that the complaint asks for equitable relief, yet the
specification of injury to the claim for damages are for legal relief, and
it was not error to proceed upon the legal remedy and try the cause
before the jury. The fact that no equitable relief was awarded on the
judgment eliminates the question whether both equitable and legal relief
may be granted under the same complaint ...
"In a case of this character it is incumbent upon plaintiff to offer
proof from which the jury can find that the acts of the defendant amount-
ed to a willful misrepresentation. . .. -ps (Here the jury so found on
amply sufficient evidence.)
9 5Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Co. et al., 238 Mo. 409, 418, 419, 420, 422, 141 S. W.
1095, 1098, 1099 (1911).96Westcott Chuck Co. v. Oneida Nat. Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247, 251, 92 N. E. 639,
640 (1910); Seymour v. McCormick, 16 How. 480, 14 L. ed. 1024 (U. S. 1853).97Truzzolino Food Products Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 108 Mont. 408, 91 P. (2d)
415 (1939).
98d. at 416, 418, 91 P. (2d) at 417, 418-419.
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The Iowa court once said that the evidence in a case before it furnished
4'no basis upon which the jury could have returned a verdict for actual
damages. A verdict based wholly upon speculative considerations could not
have been sustained. Because of the very great difficulty in laying a founda-
tion for actual damages in actions at law in cases where unfair competition
is charged, the remedy is peculiarly one for equity."9 9 However, if the
action is an action at law, a defendant cannot prevent a jury trial when such
trial is demanded by the plaintiff.
Accountings for Profits
An accounting of the defendant's profits may be ordered regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff proves that he has suffered any loss because such
an accounting is based, not on plaintiff's loss, but on defendant's wrong-
doing in that he has used the plaintiff's property for his own benefit wrong-
fully. "In contemplation of law such profits are diverted from the plaintiff,
being obtained through the improper invasion of plaintiff's trade rights.
Entirely apart from the question of actual damage the owner of a trade-mark
is entitled to recover from an infringer the profits realized by the latter
from the sales under the simulated trade-mark."'' 1
An accounting of the plaintiff's profits may be ordered as one means of
establishing the extent of his loss. This is sometimes called "Accounting
for Damages." Either form of accounting may be ordered in both trade-mark
and unfair competition cases.
There was an action of "account" or "account rendered" at common law
by means of which persons under legal duty to account for money or property
in their custody could be compelled to state such accounts and to pay any
balance due. The basis of equity jurisdiction over unfair competition and
trade-mark infringement cases need not be discussed here. As to account-
ings, it rests on the complicated character of the issues involved and the
fact that the relations between the infringer and the owner of the infringed
mark are regarded as fiduciary in character. Ironically enough, in view of
the great delay and complication involved in accounting actions, this juris-
diction.is said to rest, inter alia, upon the delay and expense involved.
In a court of equity, the findings of a master in a reference to determine an
award have the weight of a verdict by jury and are nbt easily set aside.
Referring to a plaintiff's right to an accounting of defendant's profits,
9 9 Roggensack v. Winona Monument Co., 211 Iowa 1307, 1311, 233 N. W. 493, 49i(1930).
100 Modesto Creamery v. St!nislaus Creamery Co., 168 Cal. 289, 142 Pac. 845 (1914),
citing Graham v. Plate, 40 Cal. 593 (1871).
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Judge Conway, of the New York Court of Appeals, said, in 1941, that,
"There is no distinction in this respect between actions for unfair compe-
tition involving trade-marks and those involving trade names."101
An accounting of profits will not be ordered where the court can discover
no theory upon which some recovery may be had. Even though there is "an
illegitimate use of the word," if an accounting would "require an excursion
into realms of conjecture and speculation without hope of tangible result,"
it may be denied. And while the plaintiff must rely on proof of his own
injury, where, as often happens, that cannot be shown with accuracy, he
may show nominal damages and the court may then grant an award in the
nature of increased damages.
In 1881, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in a patent case,
that to support an award to plaintiff there must be a finding -that he has
been injured and that a bill for a naked accounting for profits will not lie.10 2
It is held also that where there is no threat or menace of further infringement
and injunction is not required, the remedy is at law, not in equity, and an
accounting is not granted.
Under the Trade-Mark Statute of 1905, as under the common law, an
accounting is not mandatory; it may be denied, where to grant it would
be inequitable.10 3 This statute provides for an accounting of profits, the
trade-mark owner being required to prove the infringer's sales only, while
the infringer must show all elements of cost.'0 The Act provides also for
damages as shown by the facts as well as for punitive damages.
In 1911, in Westinghouse v. Wagner Mfg. Co.,. 05 also a patent case, the
Supreme Court considered the problems involved in the recovery of profits.
It quoted an English judge0 6 who said that there was no form of account
more difficult to work out than an account of profits, but that the difficulties
presented no reason why the plaintiff should be denied its rights; that a
plaintiff is entitled to recover all of the profits of the infringer, and that,
while, under certain conditions, there must be an apportionment of expenses
1o'Winifred Warren, Inc. v. Turner's Gowns, Ltd., 285 N. Y. 62, 68, 32 N. E. (2d)
793, 795, 48 U. S. Pat. Q. 709 (1941); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., ,Inc. v. Rosen, 108
F. (2d) 632, 30 T. M. Rep. 165; 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 379 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
10 2Root v. R.R., 105 U. S. 189, 26 L. ed. 975 (1881). See also Tubular Heating &
Ventilating Co. v. Mt. Vernon Furnace & Mfg. Co., 2 F. (2d) 982, 984 (E. D. Ill.
1924).
l03Golden West Brewery Co. v. Milonas & Sons, Inc., 104 F. (2d) 880, 882, 42 U. S.
Pat. Q. 185 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Baker v. Master Printer's Union, 34 F. Supp. 808,
812, 47 U. S. Pat. Q. 69 (D. N. J. 1940).
10433 STAT. 729 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 99 (1940).
105225 U. S. 604, 32 Sup. Ct. 691 (1912).
106Siddell v. Vickers, 9 Rep. Pat. Cas. 152 (C. A. 1892).
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in determining the profits, if a defendant commingles and confuses its
accounts, all his profits must go to the plaintiff. The loss in this situation
must fall on either the innocent or the guilty. Faced with such an alternative,
the law places the loss on the wrongdoer, following the rule that the defend-
ant may not take advantage of his own wrong.
Four years later, this problem on broad lines was before the Court again
in Hamilon-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co. ("American Girl" Shoe
case) 1° 7 where it held that the term "American Girl" was plaintiff's valid
trade-mark on shoes and therefore plaintiff was entitled to the profits ac-
quired by defendant from sales under the label "American Lady" upon a
principle analogous to that which charges a trustee with the profits acquired
by the wrongful use of the property of a cestui que trust. The court went
on to say:
".. . the jurisdiction must be rested upon . . . the right to an injunc-
tion-but the court of equity, having acquired jurisdiction upon such
a ground, retains it for the purpose of administering complete relief,
rather than send the injured party to a court of law for his damages.
And profits are then allowed as an equitable measure of compensation
on the theory of a trust ex maleficio. In the courts of England, the rule
seems to be that a party aggrieved must elect between damages and'
profits, and cannot have both. In this country, it is generally held
that in a proper case both damages and profits may be awarded.' 0 8
The doctrine of the Hamilton-Brown case was borrowed from patent law.
It was applied in early cases of trade-mark infringement and has been gener-
ally accepted as the basis for an accounting of infringer's profits, both in
technical trade-mark and unfair competition cases.1°9 In applying the doc-
trine, it is often necessary, however, to adjust it to the equities of the par-
ticular situation. Justice Holmes once said, "To call the infringer nn agent
or trustee is not to state a fact but merely to indicate a mode of approach
and an imperfect analogy by which the wrongdoer will be made to hand over
107Hamnilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269
(1916).
108.d at 259, 36 Sup. Ct. at 272.
1O9Avery & Sons v. Meikle, 85 Ky. 435, 3 S. W. 609 (1887); Regis v. Jaynes, 191
Mass. 245, 77 N. E. 774 (1906) ; Martin v. Martin & Wilckes, 75 N. J. Eq. 257, 72 Atl.
294 (1909); Westcott Chuck Co. v. Oneida Nat. Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247, 252, 92
N. E. 639, 640 (1910); Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Safe Cabinet Co., 110 Ohio St. 609,
144 N. E. 711, 15 T. M. Rep. 14 (1924); Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97
F. (2d) 689, 690, 38 U. S. Pat. Q. 449 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; Winifred Warren, Inc.
v. Turner's Gowns, Ltd., 285 N. Y. 62, 68, 32 N. E. (2d) 793, 795, 48 U. S. Pat. Q.
709 (1941).
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the proceeds of his wrong. Circumstances will affect the conclusion, includ-
ing in them the knowledge and the conduct of the party charged."110
In 1896, the Supreme Court had decided Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg.
Co."" This was an unfair competition case. An accounting of profits was
ordered, although there was no infringement of a technical trade-mark. This
decision has been said to have set at rest whatever doubt had previously
existed as to whether an accounting could be had in unfair competition
cases.
112
The question of compensation to plaintiffs was before the Seventh Circuit
in 1901, in Williams v. Mitchell. The defendant deceived purchasers and
the public into believing that their goods were those of the plaintiff. This
was "an invasion of the complainants' rights" and the complainants were
held entitled to compensation to the extent of the invasion.113
Where there is infringement of a technical, non-descriptive trade-mark,
injury will be presumed and an inquiry into the profits made or damages
caused by the defendant will follow normally. The same rule of presumption
applies to unfair competition cases "although the reason therefor will be
o? less imperative character than in cases where a More definite and positive
right has been infringed." 114
The relief which the courts award to repair the injury suffered by a
plaintiff from unfair competition is based upon the wrong of the defendant.115
The liability of the defendant must be derived from unfair competition if it
exists. It is not predicated upon the fact that the defendant may have made
profits from his wrongful acts. He may have made no profits or he may
have made profits far in excess of plaintiff's damage.
Although an'accounting normally is ordered when an injunction has been
granted, a decree for profits does not necessarily follow an injunction." 16 It
110 Larson, Jr., Co. v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U. S. 97, 99, 48 Sup. Ct. 449
(1928).
n1163 U. S. 169, 204, 16 Sup. Ct. 1002, 1015 (1896).
112Worcester Brewing Co. v. Rueter, 157 Fed. 217, 218 (C. C. A. 1st, 1907).
11Williams v. Mitchell, 106 Fed. 168, 172 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901).
114. T. S. Co. v. Tee Pee Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 794, 798 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
Accord Straus et al. v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U. S. 179, 181, 36 Sup. Ct. 288, 289(1916) ; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Rosen, 108 F. (2d) 632, 636, 40 U. S. Pat. Q. 379(C. C. A. 6th, 1940).l'6Michel Cosmetics Inc. v. Tsirkas, 282 N. Y. 195, 199, 26 N. E. (2d) 16, 17, 45
U. S. Pat. Q. 627 (1940); Platinum Products Corp. v. Berthold, 280 N. Y. 752, 21
N. E. (2d) 520 (1939) ; Westcott Chuck Co. v. Oneida Nat. Chuck Co., 199 N. Y. 247,
92 N. E. 639 (1910); Faber v. Hovey, 73 N. Y. 592 (1878).
11GStraus et al. v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., Z40 U. S. 179, 181, 36 Sup. Ct. 288, 289(1916); Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379, 381 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912) ;
W. G. Reardon Laboratories v. B. & B. Exterminators, 3 F. Supp. 467, 476, 17 U. S.
Pat. Q. 406 (D. Md. 1933), aff'd on this point although otherwise modified, id. 71
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may be denied because an injunction adequately protects the rights of the
plaintiff,"" or for other reasons.
While the rule requiring an infringer to account for his net profit' is
applicable to unfair competition cases independent of trade-mark infringe-
ment, there are limitations of which Justice Holmes once said, "Very possibly
the statutory rule for wrongful use of a trade-mark may be extended by
analogy to unfair competition in a proper case. But as the ground of recov-
ery in the latter instance is that the defendant has taken some undue advan-
tage of the plaintiff's reputation, or that of his goods, and as the nature of
extent of the Wrong may vary indefinitely, it cannot be assumed in all cases
that the defendant's sales were due to that alone."" 8 Some courts have even
expressed doubt as to whether the rule is not limited to technical trade-mark
cases.
119
F. (2d) 515, 22 U. S. Pat. Q. 22 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App.
(2d) 116, 130 P. (2d) 220 (1942).
""7O'Cedar Corp. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 73 F. (2d) 366, 367, 23 U. S. Pat. Q.
171 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; I. T. S. Co. v. Tee Pee Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 794, 798
(C. C. A. 6th, 1923) ; Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379, 381 (C. C. A.
2d, 1912) ; Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Arena & Sons, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 290, 294,
40 U. S. Pat. Q. 639 (E. D. Pa. 1939) ; Plough, Inc. v. Intercity Oil Co., 26 F. Supp.
978, 984, 40 U. S. Pat. Q. 554 (E. D. Pa. 1939). In Rowley Co. v. Rowley, 193 Fed.
390, 393 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1912), it was even said that "courts will refrain from ordering
an accounting of profits where an injunction will satisfy the substantial equities of
the case."1
'
5 Straus et al v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U. S. 179, 181, 36 Sup. Ct. 288, 289
(1916). There was unfair competition in the use of a label. The trade name, however,
was distinctive- and there were other indications that pirchasers had been led to select
defendant's goods by other considerations than by the use of a label resembling plain-
tiff's. The Court said at page 183: "Taking all these considerations into account, coupled
with the absence of evidence that any deceit or substitution was accomplished in fact,
we find it impossible to believe that any considerable part of the petitioner's business
was due to their goods being supposed to be the plaintiff's hose. The petitioners prop-
erly were enjoined from further use of the mark in controversy, but, so far as the
decree charged them with profits, it is reversed."
"19Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 170 Fed. 167, 169 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909). The cases in
which the whole profits have been allowed "are proper trade-mark cases, in which the
defendant having used a trade-mark proper, the presumption was that the goods would
not have been sold without that use." In this case, the unfair competition consisted in
the improper getup of a dictionary. An accounting was deniel.
In Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Bournonville, 260 Fed. 442 (D. N. J. 1915), defendants re-
filled with their own acetylene gas, tanks bearing the plaintiff's trade-mark and then
sold them or distributed them for sale among dealers. Plaintiff's trade-mark was in-
fringed and plaintiff was entitled to an accounting of profits realized from such sales.
Defendants also had committed acts held to be unfair competition. With respect to
the unfair competition, the injured party is not entitled to recover profits "as of right"
but only upon what might be considered "sufficient grounds." Complainant was not
entitled to an accounting for profits due to strictly unfair competition "apart from
trade-mark infringement, but was entitled to an accounting of defendant's profits from
refilling and selling tanks bearing complainant's trade-mark, except in cases where
they have refilled them directly for automobiles for their individual use."
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There are cases of unfair competition where an accounting of all net profits
is as reasonable as in any trade-mark infringement action. This depends on
the nature of the competition and the facts involved. The decisions offer
no rule of general application. A reasonable test would seem to be whether
it can fairly be assumed that the defendant's sales were due to the unfair
competition. Such an assumption is reasonable where the name or mark
used is in the public domain and has acquired a secondary meaning by virtue
of its use by plaintiff as a trade-mark. Unfair competition by such means
is closely similar to technical trade-mark infringement. The same is true
where the defendant imitates the appearance of the goods 20 or their wrap-
pings or other features of their dress, even where his goods are clearly
marked with his name121 or with his distinctive trade-mark. However, such
marking may be sufficiently distinctive to make the issue doubtful. Where
the defendant imitates advertising or a trade name and uses the imitation
not on the goods but on signs or on stationery, a presumption that his sales
were due to these acts is less reasonable.
Where a defendant imitates plaintiff's mark on letterheads or advertise-
ments in such a way as to give the impression that he is the original manu-
facturer, there may be reason for assuming that each sale made by him
was influenced by these acts, although some adjustment of the award may
be required.122
Apportionment of Profits
.Where an accounting of all net profits cannot fairly be granted, an appor-
tionment may be made, with the accounting, limited to such sales as may
reasonably be presumed to have been made by virtue of the unfair competi-
1201n Globe-Wernicke Co. v. Safe-Cabinet Co., 110 Ohio St. 609, 616, 617, 144
N. E. 711, 713, 15 T. M. Rep. 14 (1924), defendant copied the name, the distinctive
color and other elements of plaintiff's product. An accounting of all net profits was
granted. ". . . where the wrong consists of such an infringement of a trade-mark of
another, or such an imitation or simulation of the adopted name or the distinctive
design, decoration and appearance of the manufactured article of another, as to result
in unfair competition, and the infringement or imitation is shown to be deliberate and
willful, the injured party is entitled to recover all the profits realized by the offending
party upon the manufactured articles in question."
'
21In William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Larson, Jr., Co., 5 F. (2d) 731 (N. D. Ill. 1925),
aff'd, 20 F. (2d) 830, 831 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927), Larson had been granted an injunction
and accounting because of the copying of the dress of its packages. Wrigley objected
to the inclusion in the accounting of profits on certain packages which were marked
with its name as manufacturer. Since the packages were similar, irrespective of whether
or not they were marked with the manufacturer's name, no such distinction was drawn
on the accounting, and it was proper for profits arising from all sales.122Rowley Co. v. Rowley, 193 Fed. 390 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1912).
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tion,12 or which the plaintiff can prove to have resulted from the unfair
competition.'- If there is no practical basis for such an opportionment, an
accounting of profits may be denied altogether.125 An infringer may rebut
the presumption that his unfair acts were responsible for his entire profit
by evidence showing that his sales and his profits were due to other causes.
Judge Denison in speaking of the rule that a defendant must account for
his profits on every article which bore the infringing trade-mark, remarked
that the reasoning on which the rule is based is not inconsistent with the
disputable character of this presumption:
"Not only does this result follow from adopting the analogy of the
patent law, but we take this to be the rule also of trade-mark cases;
and when some of them declare that the defendant must respond for
his profits on every article which bore the trade-mark stamp upon it,
they intend to go no further than to say that such marking raises a pre-
sumption that the sale thereof was effectuated by this false marking or
unfair competition. They are not inconsistent with the disputable char-
acter of this presumption. In many cases, probably in the typical case,
it would be practically impossible to dispute the presumption, because,
even if it apeared that the first purchaser, like the wholesaler or dealer,
12 3 1n Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn-Lynn Shoe Co., 103 Me. 334, 69 At. 569 (1907),
defendant's trade-mark was infringed and its use of its trade name was unfair com-
petition. Defendant was ordered to account for profits derived from the sale of shoes
impressed with the trade-mark and from shoes not so marked but which were sold
with the aid of unfair competition. This excluded sales of unmarked shoes to local
dealers who would know they were not the plaintiff's shoes or to persons who never
had known of the plaintiff's existence.
124Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 377 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912) was a case of
unfair competition by use of the name "Webster's" on dictionaries. This name had
acquired a secondary meaning which obligated a user whose rights did not derive
from the original Webster Dictionary to qualify his use. Where the name was used
without such qualification, it was presumed that any sale resulted from its unlawful use.
There could be no such inference from the sale of dictionaries which carried the quali-
fication with the name and yet if it could be shown that such dictionaries, though
properly marked were in some other manner represented to be those of the plaintiff
and were bought because of such a misrepresentation, such sales would be held to be
the result of unfair competition. The plaintiff therefore was entitled to all profits of the
defendant from the sale of dictionaries which did not bear the necessary explanation
with the name and also the profits from sales of dictionaries properly marked where
it was established that these sales were the result of a belief that the books were those
* of the plaintiff, actively induced by the defendant through some unfair act beyond the
mere use of the name. In John H. Woodbury Inc. v. Win. A. Woodbury Corp., 23
F. Supp. 162, 171, 38 U. S. Pat. Q. 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1938), the defendants were
required "to account for any profits which have accrued to them and which can be
shown to have been directly and specifically attributable to the use of the name 'Wood-
bury' or 'Woodbury's' in connection with the manufacturing, selling or advertising of
defendants' Toilet preparations."
1251. T. S. Co. v. Tee Pee Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 794, 798 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923). See
also Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269 (1916);
and comment in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 405, 60
Sup. Ct. 681, 686, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 607 (1940).
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knew what he was buying, this would not, of itself, affect the presump-
tion of a fraud upon the ultimate consumer or user; but, even in the
case of a technical trade-mark, if every purchaser, immediate and ulti-
mate, knew that he was getting the counterfeit, and not the genuine,
and bought it because he preferred the counterfeit to the genuine, there
would be no liability for profits.' 1 26
The offense in this case was use of the name "Webster" on a dictionary,
which name plaintiff claimed by secondary meaning. The reasoning of the
court was this: C
"The cases where there has been no division of profits, but the whole
profits have been allowed, are proper trade-mark cases, in which, the
defendant having used a trade-mark proper, the presumption was that
the goods would not have been sold without that use. [Citing cases.]
The present case, however, does not fully take on that feature. The sub-
stantial offense of Ogilvie did not consist in availing himself of a
Merriam Company's trade-mark, because both this court and the Cir-
cuit Court have expressly found that there was no trade-mark. It
consisted in dressing up his publications unlawfully. Therefore, there
is no concrete thing which belongs to the Merriam Company the value
of which can be substantially determined in this connection.' 2 7
Judge Denison distinguishes patent cases from trade-mark cases with
respect to liability for profits. He points out that the patent owner has a
monopoly. "Not so," he says, "regarding a trade-mark and the right to
protection against unfair competition; these rights are only incidental to an
existing business; they cannot be independently injured or suffer damages;
they do not create any monopoly in the article itself; there can be no damage
in connection with violation of these rights, except as there is injury to the
business and good will; and this damage can be only through loss of sales
which otherwise would have accrued to the injured business. . "...,12 This
statement, written in 1912, undoubtedly is sound today with respect to
liability for profits, but it is not applicable, and obviously was not intended
to be applicable, to liability for all damages which the plaintiff may have
suffered.
The rule as to the apportionment of profits and the evidence on which it
is based has been long discussed. In 1883, Mr. Justice Field in the opinion
of the Supreme Court in Garretson v. Clark'29 suggested that in an account-
ing of profits in patent cases, the patentee must apportion the defendant's
'
26Merriain Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 377 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
127G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 170 Fed. 167, 169 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909).
'
28Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 376 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912).
129111 U. S. 120, 4 Sup. Ct. 291 (1883).
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profits and the patentee's damages between the patented features and the
unpatented features, and such evidence must be reliable and tangible and
not conjectural or speculative. The Court applied this doctrine in 1911, in
Westinghouse v., Wagner.130 In 1939, it had the question before it in a
copyright case' 31 and followed the Westinghouse 'decision.
Where, as pointed out in the Westinghouse case, it is difficult or impossible
to carry the burden of apportionment, the whole loss must fall on the wrong-
doer and there will be no apportionment. The Court cited as analogous a
case involving the separation of intrastate earnings and expenses from inter-
state earnings and expenses to determine whether one of them was con-
fiscatory, where "the testimony of several experts as to the relative cost of,
doing a local and a through business was received."'132 And it was held that
the procedure used in tax cases in the separation of earnings could be used
in patent cases with respect to the apportionment of profits. This analogy
is referred to by Judge Hughes in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp.,133 where the Supreme Court again considered the question of appor-
tionment. The Court had discussed this question in Dowagiac v. Minnesota
Moline Plow Co.,'3 where it required only "reasonable approximation."
This, Judge Hughes said in the Sheldon case, "usually may be obtained from
the testimony of experts and persons informed by observation and experi-
ence." He pointed out that "testimony of this character was said [in the
Dowagiac case] to be 'generally helpful and at times indispensable in the
solution of such problems.'" These principles were held to be applicable
to copyright cases.13
A defendant's profits may be greater than any loss which plaintiff can
show. When this is the fact, defendant should be ordered to turn over all
of his profits. The justice of this was recognized by the California court
as early as 1871,136 and in a more recent Arizona case, the court said:
"The evidence on this issue was somewhat vague in its nature. De-
fendant, however, gave testimony which might reasonably be construedto show that he profited by selling foods bearing plaintiff's trademark
130225 U. S. '604, 32 Sup. Ct. 691 (1911).
'mSheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 60 Sup. Ct. 681, 44
U. S. Pat. Q. 607 (1939).
13 2 Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 20 Sup. Ct. 336 (1899).
lwSheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 403, 60 Sup. Ct. 681,
685, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 607 (1940).
134235 U. S. 641, 35 Sup. Ct. 221 (1915).
=Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390, 407, 60 Sup. Ct. 681,
687, 44 U. S. Pat. Q. 607 (1940).
136 Graham v. Plate, 40 Cal. 593 (1871). See also Stonebraker v. Stonebraker, 33
Md. 252 (1870) ; Nelson v. J. H. Winchell & Co., 203 Mass. 75, 89 N. E. 180 (1909).
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in a sum greater than that allowed by the court as damages. The rule of
law as to the measure of damages in a case of this kind is that defendant
will be held to account for the profits derived from the unauthorized use
of the trademark.' 3 7
137M. R. Cano-v. Arizona Frozen Products Co., 38 Ariz. 404, 410, 300 Pac. 953,
955 (1931).
